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ABSTRACT 
KAPLAN’S PUZZLE, DYNAMIC SENSES, AND DIACHRONIC PROPOSITIONS !
by !
Jack Kingston !!
The University of  Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2014 
Under the Supervision of  Professor Michael N. Liston !
The Fregean encounters a few interconnected problems in his account of  indexical 
sentences, each posed in one way or another by Kaplan’s puzzle of  cognitive dynamics. 
For one, there’s a problem defending the doctrine that the very same propositions can be 
expressed in relevantly different contexts. And two, there’s the problem of  cases where the 
same indexically expressed belief, the content of  which is a Fregean proposition, seems to 
be retained by a subject yet the subject is unable to express her belief  with the correct 
indexical due to contextual mislocation. Both are related to the puzzle of  cognitive 
dynamics, but for the Fregean appear in the form of  what I’ll call The Re-expressibility 
Problem—since the more fundamental Fregean principle of  propositional re-expressibility 
is being undermined. Consideration of  other Fregean commitments shows that the only 
way to adjudicate the problem is by demonstrating that different coreferring indexicals 
can have the same sense. After demonstrating that different coreferring indexicals can 
have the same sense, it is then shown that these indexical senses must be dynamic entities, 
persisting through changes of  context. The puzzle of  cognitive dynamics reappears as 
something of  an objection to the proposed solution to the The Re-expressibility Problem. The 
final portion of  the paper is devoted to answering these objections and dispelling the 
puzzlement engendered by Kaplan’s ‘cognitive dynamics’. 
!
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS !
1. Cognitive Dynamics: A Puzzle for Kaplanians and Fregeans !
2. The Re-expressibility Problem: RP-NIC !
3. A Partial Solution to RP-NIC !
4. RP-MM and Dynamic De Re Senses !
5. An Objection: Kaplan’s Rip Van Winkle Case Adapted !
6. A Solution to the Puzzle Cases: The Constraints of  Diachronic Rationality !
7. Conclusion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
	 I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Michael Liston, for his time, patience, keen 
eye and wisdom; the writing workshop participants, particularly Alex Papulis, Dennis 
Mulqueen, and the faculty supervisor, Prof. Joshua Spencer; and my thesis committee, 
including Profs. Michael Liston, Robert Schwartz, and Joshua Spencer. 
iv
!1
	 According to a well-known Fregean dictum, the very same thought or proposition, 
including propositions expressed with sentences containing indexicals, can be re-expressed 
at different times and places and by different speakers. As Frege once wrote,   
If  someone wants to say today what he expressed yesterday using the word “today”, 
he will replace this word with “yesterday”. Although the thought is the same its verbal 
expression must be different so that the sense, which would otherwise be affected by 
differing times of  utterance, be readjusted. (296).   1!
But according to Frege, senses and only senses compose propositions; while propositions 
themselves are the senses of  whole sentences. If  the sense of  a sentence is a proposition 
and different sentences have different senses, then different sentences will express different 
propositions. Thus it seems like ‘today’ used today and ‘yesterday’ used tomorrow must 
express the same sense; otherwise they won’t compose—with certain assumptions about 
compositionality—to express the same thought—which would contradict the above 
Fregean dictum.  
	 Here, we will present two related objections to the Fregean view outlined above: 
Kaplan’s puzzle of  cognitive dynamics, in which the retention and re-expression of  index-
ically expressed beliefs is at issue, and the problem of  propositional re-expressibility itself, 
in which detractors (e.g. Perry, Burge, and Kripke) suppose that the very same indexically 
expressed proposition cannot be re-expressed if  such propositions are composed of  senses 
and only senses.  Since the two are related, this paper will take on both of  them, arguing 
that, despite appearances, ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ used on successive days can in fact ex-
press the same sense, thereby preserving the Fregean dictum according to which the very 
same indexically expressed proposition can be re-expressed with appropriate change of  
!
	
 Gottlob Frege, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry,” Mind, The New Series, vol. 65, No. 259, (July 1956), pp. 289-311. 1
!2
indexicals. Though this might strike some as counterintuitive—since such indexicals seem 
to be different modes of  presentation of  the referent—it is shown that such a supposition 
rests on certain assumptions about how to individuate the senses of  temporal indexicals. 
Hence what’s called for is a motivated revision of  the criterion employed in individuating 
these senses, but a revision that preserves the core of  the unrevised criterion while sup-
plementing it with other suitable constraints. This revision is related to another proposed 
revision: that we should not and cannot facilely equate the sense of  a term with the mode 
of  presentation expressed by the term, since there are cases in which different, coreferring 
indexicals are shown to have the same sense (on the revised criterion) while expressing 
different modes of  presentation. It is then argued that there is a way to preserve the vying 
cluster of  intuitions: by appealing to dynamic, diachronically persisting senses—and 
thereby diachronically individuated propositions. Though this might seem un-Fregean, it 
should be kept in mind that Frege himself  once wrote, “Even the timeless, if  it is to be 
anything for us, must somehow be implicated with the temporal.”  2
1. Cognitive Dynamics: A Puzzle for Kaplanians and Fregeans	  
	 Near the end of  his seminal “Demonstratives,” Kaplan asks the reader to consider 
the following: 
Suppose that yesterday you said, and believed it, “It is a nice day today.” What 
does it mean to say, today, that you have retained that belief ? It seems unsatis-
factory to just believe the same content under any old character—where is the 
retention? You can’t believe that content under the same character (537). 
Kaplan supposes this is problematic, raising what he calls the problem of  ‘cogni-
tive dynamics’: 
!
	
 ibid. 3102
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Thus the problem of  cognitive dynamics can be put like this: what does it 
mean to say of  an individual who at one time sincerely asserted a sentence 
containing indexicals that at some later time he has (or has not) changed his mind 
with respect to his assertion? What sentence or sentences must he be willing to 
assert at that later time (fn. 64, 538). 
Recall that, on the Kaplanian framework, the character of  an indexical sentence (being 
determined by the character of  its component indexical) is a function from a context to a 
content (i.e. to a proposition). Moreover, the ‘character’ is never a part of  the ‘content’ of  
the sentence—determining the content from the outside, so to speak—and the very same 
content can be determined by any number of  characters—since such characters remain 
external to the contents themselves, that is, such characters are not constituents of  the 
content or proposition. Likewise, different contents can be determined with the same 
characters in different contexts, accounting for the context-sensitivity of  indexicals. The 
puzzle, however, is ultimately a matter of  a believing subject not being in a position to 
appropriately adjust the character using a different indexical in a change of  context. Thus 
determining whether or not a subject has retained a belief  becomes somewhat puzzling, 
since it isn’t entirely clear which sentences the subject must affirm or deny in order to dis-
close her belief  or a change thereof. It thus regards the retention of  the belief  in cases 
where a subject may have a belief  with a certain content but be unable to express that 
belief  with the appropriately coordinated character.  This coordination can break apart.  3
	 Suppose, as Kaplan does, that somebody wants to express today a belief  they 
formed and expressed yesterday as, “It is a nice day today.” And suppose further that this 
subject thinks two days have past, thus expressing her belief  by saying, “It was a nice day 
!
	
 By ‘appropriately coordinated’ I mean only that the character used to determine the content must be appropriate to the 3
context, thereby matching content, context and character in such a manner that the intended proposition is expressed. 
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the day before yesterday.”  Though this subject seems to have a belief  about the day in 4
which she first uttered, “It is a nice day today,” it isn’t entirely clear that she is retaining 
that belief, because the only way she could determine that content—the only character at 
her disposal, given her erroneous contextual self-location (i.e. two days rather than one 
day after her initial utterance)—is with ‘the day before yesterday’. But of  course this 
character, whether she likes it or not, determines a quite different content—thus giving 
voice to a quite different belief. 
	 Since characters, together with contexts, determine the contents of  beliefs, when 
there’s a shift of  context—and in order to appropriately re-express the same belief—the 
content would seem to need to be believed under a different character. Kaplan wonders 
what indexical sentences a subject must be willing to assent to or dissent from in order to 
exhibit her retention of  the original belief. On Kaplan’s account, it would seem that an 
appropriate change of  character is required in order for the subject to be able to express 
and thereby retain the original belief.  But there are cases in which a subject can neither 
believe the same content under the same character in relevant changes of  context nor ex-
press or retain the same belief  due to an inability to coordinate the context with the char-
acter. The Fregean, on the other hand, inherits this puzzle in a particularly perplexing 
form. Not only must the Fregean answer to a form of  the puzzle adapted to the Fregean 
framework, in which senses and not objects are constituents of  the content, but such an 
application reveals the more basic problem of  propositional re-expressibility itself.  
	 But in order to bring this into view, it will be helpful to briefly review a few of  the 
relevant Fregean doctrines. First, there’s the famous distinction between sense and reference. 
!
	
 My example, not Kaplans. This is an adapted version of the Rip Van Winkle case well take on later. 4
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As it goes, the Fregean wants to suppose that the semantic contents of  linguistic expres-
sions are senses (Sinne). Without delving too deeply into the original motivation for posit-
ing such entities, it’s important to have a minimum, working notion. So consider the fol-
lowing two sentences: 
!
(1a) Cicero wrote Hortensius. !
and 
	   
Tully wrote Hortensius. !
	 Prior to Frege, it was widely supposed that these sentences must have the same 
truth-value, because ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ refer to the same person and coreferring terms 
are supposed to be intersubstitutable salva veritate. Frege noted at least two important 
things. First, that there is an informative difference between ‘Cicero is Cicero’ and ‘Cicero 
is Tully’—the former being trivial, the latter not. In the case of  ‘Cicero is Tully’, it might 
have been a historical discovery that the referent of  ‘Cicero’ and the referent of  ‘Tully’ 
were in fact the same person. Fregean ‘sense’ is supposed to account for the non-trivially 
informative difference between these sentences. Second—and perhaps a more perspicu-
ous illustration of  sense—Frege noted that these sentences behave very differently in 
oblique contexts, especially in contexts of  belief-ascription, where the individuation of  
sense is supposed to reflect the intensionality of  belief  and is determined within the con-
text of  a theory of  what a subject is or is not rationally required to believe, given other 
related beliefs.  So consider these two belief  reports:  5
(1b) Mona believes that Cicero wrote Hortensius. 
!
	
 See Heck [2002]5
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and 
	  
Mona does not believe that Tully wrote Hortensius. !
Again, on the pre-Fregean account, since coreferring terms are supposed to be intersubsti-
tutable salva veritate, when Mona believes that Cicero wrote Hortensius, it should also be 
true of  her that she believe that Tully wrote Hortenius. But our intuitions dictate a rather 
different assessment—that Mona ought to be credited with rational coherence despite 
identity of  reference. Fregean ‘sense’ captures these intuitions: it’s not that the referents 
aren’t identical; rather the senses of  the referents, or their ‘modes of  presentation’, aren’t 
identical. As such, the Fregean endorses the distinction between sense and reference. This 
distinction is (very roughly) captured in the following principle—call it Sinn-Bedeutung: 
Coreferring terms can have different senses (Sinne), where the terms express informa-
tively different modes of  presentation (Art des Gegebenseins) of  the same referent. In such 
cases, the terms are not intersubstitutable salva veritate within oblique contexts.  
	 Since a subject is cognitively related not to the referent by itself  but to the sense of  
the term referring to the object—again, its mode of  presentation—the subject, say, Mona, 
is not contradicting herself  in believing that Cicero but not Tully wrote Hortenius. Since 
Mona could coherently recognize the sentence ‘Cicero wrote Hortensius’ to be true yet not 
take the sentence ‘Tully wrote Hortensius’ to be true, ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ have different 
senses. It would seem, then, that a subject could rationally take opposing attitudes towards 
sentences, otherwise the same, containing each name. We can elaborate this by appeal to 
a common version of  Frege’s ‘equipollence’ criterion called the ‘Intuitive Criterion’, 
!
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which, because of  its prevalence and generality, will be called ‘the naïve intuitive criterion’ 
(NIC) :  6
The sense of  sentence S, i.e. the proposition p associated with S, is different from 
the sense of  sentence S’, i.e. the p’ associated with S’, iff  anyone who understands 
both S and S’ can simultaneously take different attitudes towards each yet remain 
coherent.  7
	 Supposing that Sinn-Bedeutung and NIC so specified tentatively suffice to 
situate the discussion, we can introduce the other fundamental principles governing a 
“Fregean” account of  meaning and proceed to show precisely how Kaplan’s puzzle 
presents a somewhat intractable problem for the Fregean theory. The following then 
are the fundamental, though jointly problematic, principles endorsed by the Fregean 
(or, at least, Frege himself):  
Compositionality: The sense of  a sentence is the proposition it expresses and is 
determined by, or individuated by, the senses of  its sub-sentential parts. Substitution 
!
	
 The following criterion is based largely on Evans(cf. 1.5 [1982]). It is widely endorsed, though, at least as a starting 6
place; so it seems appropriate to let it situate the argument. See Schellenberg [2012]; quoting Frege: two sentences A 
and B can stand in such a relation that anyone who recognizes the content of A as true must thereby also recognize the 
content of B as true and, conversely, that anyone who accepts the content of B must straight away [ohne weiteres] ac-
cept that of A. (Equipollence).
 This seems to me to be the simplest formulation of the criterion. Other recent formulations can be found in Schellen7 -
berg [2012], where the criterion is formulated in terms of sameness of sense, cognitive equivalence, and recognizing
truth-value (instead of taking an attitude toward) as: Two sentences A and B are cognitively equivalent iff anyone 
who understands both A and B and takes A to have a certain truth-value must recognize that B has the same truth-value 
and vice versa(5). The aforementioned recognizingas true will be here interchangeable with taking an attitude to-
ward’ as true when appropriate (we are only talking about belief-attitudes, which seem to necessarily traffic in truth-
value). The criterion is also formulated in Dickie & Rattan [2010] as the Standard Individuating Principle for Senses 
(SIP)as: aand bdiffer in sense iff a subject who understood both expressions could, at a single time, both assent to 
a is Fand withhold assent from, or reject, b is Fwithout loss of rational coherence”(142).
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of  one sub-sentential component with sense1 for another with sense2, where sense1 ≠ 
sense2, results in a sentence with a different sense.  8
Propositional Re-Expressibility: Propositions (among which are included the 
contents of  indexical sentences) are re-expressible: for proposition p expressed at t1 by 
S1 to be (re-)expressed at t2 by S1 or at t1 by S2, the very same proposition must be ex-
pressed. 
Sense-Composition: A proposition is composed of  senses and only senses. 
	 Now how might this version of  Fregeanism fare with the puzzle being considered 
here—a puzzle about the contents of  indexical sentences? The puzzle is still about belief-
retention. However, the ‘character’ of  an indexical isn’t determining its content (i.e. refer-
ence) while nevertheless remaining extraneous to the content. Recall that, for Kaplan, the 
character is not a part of  the content of  the sentence but merely determines it from out-
side. Or differently, indexicals contribute objects themselves and not, say, “meanings,” 
“intensions,” or “descriptions” to propositions. Here, rather, reference is determined by 
Sinn—which is itself  a part of  the content of  the sentence—such that not only does the 
Fregean have the problem of  belief-retention in cases involving contextual mis-location 
(let us say) but also the problem of  belief-retention in basic cases where one is properly 
contextually located.  
	 That is, the main problem is somewhat different for the Fregean than it is for the 
Kaplanian. For Kaplan, the puzzle centers around the coordination of  character, context 
and content, with the former two determining the latter. In order to determine the in-
!
	
 Compositionality can be variously deployed, in either weak, moderate, or strong ways; so Ill try to remain non-8
committal throughout. In order to be forthright, however, I should confess that Im unsympathetic to a strong or unre-
stricted principle of compositionality, primarily due to its explanatory ambitions and the difficulty of living up to them.  
Also, the relevance of the order or sequence of composition of the component senses for determination of the sense of 
the whole is being here bypassed, though of course this would be an issue if we were getting into problems about the 
unity of the proposition, multiple decomposability, how different sentences can express the same proposition, etc. For 
now, hopefully these matters can be set aside.
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tended content (i.e. proposition) the subject must use the correct character. But the subject 
seems to be able to retain the belief  even without having the correct character at his or 
her disposal. For Kaplan, this might undermine his supposition that characters function 
specifically as determinants of  contents in contexts—and there doesn’t seem to be much 
space for error there. The “dynamics” are those factors involved in bringing about an ex-
pression with a certain content, that is, expressing a certain proposition.  For the Fregean, 9
on the other hand, there is not only the problem of  accounting for the plausible intuition 
that one can retain a belief  even without being able to determine its content with the 
specifically correct indexical, but also the related problem of  re-expressing an indexically 
expressed proposition with appropriately different indexicals. The latter problem issues 
from the Fregean supposition that the indexical contributes a Sinn to the content of  the 
sentence, contrary to the Kaplanian supposition that the indexical’s character remains 
external to the content of  the sentence. Though Kaplan confesses there’s a problem here 
for his framework, the problem is even more pronounced for the Fregean. 
	 This more fundamental problem is related both to some of  Perry’s objections to 
the notion of  indexical Sinne and to a few recent attempts (Burge [1977, 2012], Kripke 
[2011]) at resolving the problem of  the re-expressibility of  Fregean propositions—how the 
same indexically expressed proposition can be re-expressed using appropriately different 
indexicals. So as Perry inter alia has supposed, if  Compositionality and Sense-Com-
position hold, then sentences containing different indexicals, expressing different senses, 
!
	
 Though the dynamicsalso seem to be a matter of  the cognitive rigidity or looseness by which subjects can or cannot 9
retain beliefs under different characters. Sometimes Kaplan isnt entirely clear on what specifically he takes the problem 
to beperhaps hes unclear because it can take a number of  different forms. 
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can never express the same proposition.  Moreover, if  Sinn-Bedeutung holds and the 10
same terms with the same linguistic meaning have the same Sinn, then given the context-
sensitivity of  indexicals, a single sense can determine a multiplicity of  different referents. 
Both are problematic—but for now, especially the former problem, since it is claimed here 
that subjects retain the same indexically expressed belief  with the same content by appro-
priately exchanging indexicals.  In order to exhibit the problem, consider the following 11
case (to which we will refer throughout): 
(2a) Auggy says to Mona on Tuesday, “Today is gloomy.” Mona, in agreement, 
responds, “Indeed. Today is gloomy.” The next day, Wednesday, Auggy says to 
himself, “Today isn’t gloomy. Today is lovely. Yesterday was gloomy.” He then sees 
Mona and asks, “Wasn’t it gloomy yesterday?” And Mona responds, “Sure was, 
Auggy. Yesterday was gloomy. But today, today isn’t gloomy. Today is lovely.” 
Though Auggy seems to express the same belief  when he utters ‘Today is gloomy’ on 
Tuesday and ‘Yesterday was gloomy’ on Wednesday, the Fregean Compositionality 
and Sense-Composition principles, in conjunction with the assumption that the re-
spective indexicals have different senses, preclude such an equation, since together they 
entail that different propositions are expressed on Tuesday and Wednesday. Hence, unless 
one wishes to discard Propositional Re-Expressibility, one must reject either Com-
positionality or Sense-Composition. Conciliatory Fregeans might either deny 
Propositional Re-Expressibility in favor of  Compositionality and Sense-Com-
position (following Kripke [2011]) or insist on Propositional Re-Expressibility at 
the expense of  Sense-Composition (following Burge [1977, 2012]). However, the 
!
	
 See, for example, Perrys Frege on Demonstratives10
 As Frege claimed: If someone wants to say today what he expressed yesterday using the word today, he will re11 -
place this word with yesterday. Although the thought is the same its verbal expression must be different so that the 
sense, which would otherwise be affected by differing times of utterance, be readjusted.Gottlob Frege, The Thought: 
A Logical Inquiry,Mind, The New Series, vol. 65, No. 259, (July 1956), 296
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Fregean view espoused here (that is, a Fregeanism of  the obstinate variety) will deny the 
implications and abjure any such capitulations. ,   12 13
	 The Fregean thus encounters a problem of  belief-retention. Since the contents of  
beliefs are, for the Fregean, “thoughts” or propositions, and the indexical used to express 
such contents contributes a Sinn to the proposition, the problem of  belief-retention is fun-
damentally a problem about the re-expressibility of  indexical (or indexically expressed) 
contents as such. As was suggested, the puzzle of  cognitive dynamics and the problem of  
belief-retention are just another form of  Perry-style objections, which have been more 
recently manifest in the debate between Burge and Kripke.  
	 So at first glance, in order to keep the fundamental Fregean principles jointly in-
tact, it must be demonstrated that different coreferring indexicals can, contrary to ap-
pearances, express the same sense. This is counterintuitive. But without demonstrating 
this point, the same (indexical) proposition cannot be re-expressed using appropriately 
different indexicals, thus contradicting Propositional Re-expressibility. That is, if  
different coreferring indexicals must express different senses, and propositions are com-
posed of  senses and only senses, and the sense of  the sentence, i.e. the proposition ex-
pressed, is determined by the senses of  its parts, then the very same (indexical) proposi-
tions can never be expressed using different coreferring indexicals. Conciliatory Fregeans 
select different ways out of  this dilemma, discarding one or another of  the fundamental 
!
	
 The contending views are, of course, legitimately Fregean,at least of some sort, depending on what one takes to be 12
authentically Fregean.Perhaps one might even think the view defended here is not Fregean,despite it being labeled 
obstinate.
 Let me note: this paper doesnt pretend to be a historical treatment of Freges thought itself or to engage in the ex13 -
egetical quarrels surrounding it.
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principles. But in order to preserve all four principles, the obstinate Fregean must demon-
strate that different coreferring indexicals can in fact have the same sense—a formidable 
task indeed. 
2. The Re-expressibility Problem: RP-NIC 
	 Contrary to the Kaplanian, for whom the indexical character changes or ‘adjusts’ 
the determination of  content but is not itself  a part of  the content, and thus changes in 
character do not necessarily result in changes of  content, the Fregean takes the indexical 
to contribute a Sinn to the content. Hence if  the indexical sense-constituent changes along 
with change of  indexicals, i.e. if  different indexicals have different senses, then by Com-
positionality so too does the content expressed with the indexical terms. Thus setting 
aside, for the moment, the unique problem posed by cognitive dynamics in the form of  
puzzle cases where the subject has either lost track of  time or is unable to keep track of  
time, the Fregean (of  the obstinate variety) must resolve The Re-expressibility Problem. 
	 The Re-expressibility Problem is manifest in a couple of  ways. The most urgent in-
volves the above criterion of  individuation (call it ‘RP-NIC’) which presents the problem-
atic nature of  attempting to preserve Propositional Re-expressibility while demon-
strating that different coreferring indexicals can have the same Sinn.  RP-NIC seems to 14
be soluble if  it can be demonstrated that the indexical sentences do have the same content 
and the component indexicals do, despite being different indexicals, express the same 
sense. If  such a demonstration could be supplied, the Fregean would be well on her way 
!
	
 ‘RP’ abbreviates “the re-expressibility problem,” while ‘NIC’ abbreviates “naive intuitive criterion.”We take up RP-14
NIC in this and the next section. The other way in which RP is manifest – RP-MM – we take up in section 4.
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to preserving Propositional Re-expressibility and resolving The Re-expressibility Prob-
lem. 
	 To begin with, the problem issues from an initial analysis of  the sentences uttered 
in (2a)—whether or not they express the same proposition. According to NIC, if  a subject 
can coherently take different attitudes towards two sentences, then the sentences express 
different senses. So we ask: could Auggy take opposing attitudes to the sentence ‘Today is 
gloomy’ uttered on Tuesday and the sentence ‘Yesterday was gloomy’ uttered on Wednes-
day? That is, on an obstinately Fregean view (henceforth, OF) could Auggy remain ratio-
nally coherent if  the following scenario obtained: 
(2b) Auggy says to Mona on Tuesday, “Today is gloomy.” The next day, Wednes-
day, Auggy once again runs into Mona and says, “Today is gloomy. I wish today 
were like yesterday. Yesterday was not gloomy.”  
!
On first appearances it might appear that Auggy is being coherent.  Since ‘today’ and 
‘yesterday’ express different modes of presentation of Tuesday, the former presenting 
Tuesday as today and the latter as yesterday, it would then seem eminently plausible to 
suppose that Auggy could take different attitudes towards each sentence, given the inten-
sionally fine-grained modes under which the referent is being presented. After all, Auggy 
doesn’t seem to be contradicting himself on Wednesday, that is, it’s not as if he’s saying, 
“Yesterday was gloomy and not gloomy,” or “Yesterday was gloomy. Yesterday was not 
gloomy.” There’s nothing contradictory about Auggy’s beliefs on Wednesday—he’s rec-
ognizing only one sentence to be true, namely, ‘Yesterday was not gloomy’.  Moreover, it 
could be informative to Auggy on Wednesday that the day he’s referring to with ‘yester-
!
	
!14
day’ is in fact the same day he referred to when he said to Mona, “Today is gloomy”—he 
might not know that it’s Wednesday and nevertheless be coherent in not knowing.  In this 
case, NIC seems to prescribe an analysis in which the sentences in fact express different 
propositions, such that on Wednesday Auggy isn’t contradicting his Tuesday utterance 
and therefore isn’t rendering himself rationally incoherent. Since (2b) is a scenario in 
which the subject is preserving rational coherence despite coreference, recognizing one to 
be true and the other not, it follows that the sentences Auggy utters in (2a) also do not in 
fact express the same belief, because the content of his belief on Tuesday is not the same 
as the content of his belief on Wednesday. As such, OF cannot account for Propositional 
Re-expressibility and belief-retention.!
	 But first appearances are sometimes misleading, and in this case they are: Auggy is 
rationally incoherent in (2b) despite appearances, and the problem leading to the appear-
ance of  rational incoherence is not OF itself, but a fallacious assumption underlying this 
interpretation of  (2a) and (2b) that generates RP-NIC in the first place: the NIC uniformity 
assumption. The supposition that today and yesterday (as expressed on day n and day n+1, re-
spectively) are different senses, apparently leading to Auggy’s being able to take different 
attitudes to the two sentences in (2b), is premised on the assumption that NIC is a uni-
formly applicable criterion for individuating Sinn. But this presupposes that the criterion 
employed in synchronic cases, such as those represented in (1b), can be extended to di-
achronic cases, such as those illustrated in (2a) and (2b).  To some, it might seem that (2b) 
ought to be matched up with the case in which Mona believes both that Cicero wrote 
Hortensius and that Tully did not. As such, NIC would be applied and issue the standard 
result that: some subject A (Mona) could believe at t1 (Tuesday) that a is F (Today is 
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gloomy) and then believe at t2 (Wednesday) that b is not F (Yesterday was not fine), where 
‘a’ (‘today’) and ‘b’ (‘yesterday’) are coreferring, yet retain rational coherence, and thereby 
generate different senses corresponding to ‘a’ and ‘b’, a and b (today and yesterday), respec-
tively.  
	 Though NIC rightly places conditions on what would conform to certain implicit 
standards of  rational coherence—what a subject is rationally permitted or compelled to 
believe or not believe at the same time—it confines itself  to precisely those cases where 
the sentences are utterable at the same time, in which the subject, upon recognizing the 
truth-value of  one sentence, must recognize or decline to recognize a certain truth-value 
of  another sentence—upon being presented with it—in order not to lose coherence. 
However, what rationally counts in the temporally indexical cases are sentences with dif-
ferent but coreferring terms that are utterable only at different times, either expressing the 
same content across time or different contents at different times. But these cases elude 
NIC; we can’t assess the rational coherence of  the subject across time by appeal to the 
sentences to which she would or would not take different attitudes at the same time. The 
NIC uniformity assumption isolates portions of  the subject’s cognitive rational life, permitting 
analysis of  coherence without reference to prior commitments and without regard for the 
subject’s diachronic unity. So whether or not Mona can in fact retain rational coherence 
or unity and exhibit the conflicting attitudes expressed in (2b), NIC alone won’t be the 
criterion issuing the verdict. 
!
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3. A Partial Solution to RP-NIC 
	 Despite the fact that ‘today’ used on Tuesday and ‘yesterday’ used on Wednesday 
are only coreferring at different times and never simultaneously, the NIC uniformity assump-
tion together with the appearance of  rational coherence implies that each contributes a 
different sense to the propositions expressed by the sentences in which they occur; then 
OF implies that each indexical expresses a different sense, a different mode of  presenta-
tion of  Tuesday. Since OF couldn’t rightly deny at this point that each indexical expresses 
a different mode of  presentation, it must target the other side of  the NIC biconditional—
it must question whether Auggy can, contrary to appearances, take different attitudes to 
‘Today is gloomy’ (uttered on Tuesday) and ‘Yesterday was gloomy’ (uttered on Wednes-
day). OF must focus, then, on the legitimacy of  the NIC criterion for individuating Sinn 
and the objections that follow therefrom.  
	 The NIC uniformity assumption doesn’t necessarily follow from adherence to the ‘in-
tuitive criterion’ as such, but rather a naïve version of  the criterion—or perhaps just a 
naïve application. Such ‘intuitive’ criteria are, after all, a species of  Fregean 
‘equipollence’, the very same kind of  criterion summoned by the Fregeanism defended 
here. So OF can’t propose a repudiation of  intuitive criteria as such, but must rather 
adapt such kinds of  criteria to the needs of  diachronic rationality. The basic aim of  an 
equipollence-based criterion is making maximal rational sense of  those subjects whom we 
are inclined to credit with rational coherence and unity, disclosing what propositions a 
subject must or need not recognize to be true given the prior or simultaneous recognition 
of  truth-values of  other relevant propositions. But in the case of  propositions expressible 
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with temporally indexical sentences, we appear to get difference in sense where we might 
want sameness of  sense. Näive (synchronic) applications of  NIC neglect the constraints of  
diachronic coherence, permit the proliferation of  Sinne wherever there’s the apparent pos-
sibility of  a subject taking contrary attitudes, and thus individuate sense in an excessively 
fine-grained manner. OF needs a criterion that resists this tendency, one that allows the 
‘consolidation’ of  senses with a granularity appropriate to the constraints of  diachronic 
rather than merely synchronic rationality.   15
	 But there are clear cases in which coarse-grained consolidative tendencies seem 
the more sensible option. Consider an example (from Dickie & Rattan [2010]) in which 
the composition (°) of  an invertible function f  and its inverse f -1 yields the identity func-
tion I, such that  (f -1 ° f ) = I.  Now consider the manner in which the following inference 16
is, or is not, valid: 
( f -1 ° f ) (a) is F  
I (a) is G  
Therefore, something is both F and G  
This is, it would seem, a valid inference. On any theory of  sense, in order even to be eligi-
ble for attributions of  rational coherence or incoherence, the subject must be sufficiently 
linguistically competent, understanding the expressions used and having properly func-
tioning faculties. As we will say—collecting those preconditions into one category—the 
subject must have the ability to linguistically “keep track.” In this case, the subject’s com-
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plete understanding of  ‘(f -1 ° f )’ implies knowledge that ( f -1 ° f ) = I. As such, one can 
straightaway existentially generalize the conjoined predications of  F and G. 
	 In this example (call it ‘IEK’, or CASE 1), we deliberately postpone the issue of  
whether or not the terms express different modes of  presentation and instead focus on the 
alternative strategy for individuating Sinn which appeals to the informativeness of  identity 
statements. According to IEK, if  ‘( f -1 ° f ) = I’ were an informative identity statement, 
then the identity premise would be crucially missing in the inference, thereby permitting 
the subject rationally to withhold the conclusion. But this would be to suppose that the 
expressions are not transparently coreferring, that a subject could understand ‘(f -1 ° f )’ 
without knowing that ( f -1 ° f ) = I. But ex hypothesi not knowing that ( f -1 ° f ) = I only 
evinces an incomplete understanding of  ‘(f -1 ° f )’. Without such understanding, rationali-
ty never comes into play—at least, that is, rationality as it is relevant to belief-ascriptions 
and the individuation of  Sinn. 
	 In the case of  the composition of  f and its inverse, no such additional premise is 
required; it wouldn’t turn an invalid argument into a valid one. A subject would not quali-
fy as understanding ‘(f -1 ° f)’ without thereby knowing that (f -1 ° f ) = I. If  a subject were 
to lack complete understanding of  the terms in the premises, the inference would indeed 
seem to the subject to require an additional premise in order to render it deductively valid. 
But an inference is deductively valid or invalid despite the subject inferring. So if  a subject 
does completely understand all the terms involved yet neglects to derive the conclusion, 
she can be charged with rational incoherence, because the inference is valid of  itself. The 
logical properties of  the terms obviate the need for, or utility of, an additional identity 
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premise. In order to see this more clearly, it might be helpful to adduce a few formally 
similar examples—that is, cases in which we know, say, that a is F and b is G, and thereby 
infer that something is both F and G. First, then, consider the coreferring proper names 
‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ (CASE 2). Suppose Mona makes the following inference:  
Cicero wrote Hortensius. 
Tully wrote De Amicitia 
Therefore, somebody wrote both Hortenius and De Amicitia. 
Strictly speaking, this isn’t formally valid, since the inference omits the identity premise 
‘Cicero=Tully’. But if  Mona knows that Cicero is Tully, she’s simply suppressing the iden-
tity premise and making an enthymematic inference.  But because, strictly speaking, the 17
inference would need to include the identity premise in order to render the conclusion 
deductively valid, without which an uninformed subject could not derive the conclusion, 
CASE 2 is one in which there is difference of  sense. As such, the conclusion of  this infer-
ence is clearly not rationally compulsory. 
	 A second inference (CASE 3) of  the same logical form is one in which the mean-
ings of  the singular terms are, so to speak, drawn closer together, but not so close that un-
derstanding them implies immediate knowledge of  coreference. For example, a subject 
might know both that 24 + 5 is the legal drinking age and that 3+3+3+3+3+6 is the 
number of  times I’ve changed my writing sample topic, without thereby concluding Some-
thing is the legal drinking age and the number of  times I’ve changed my writing sample topic.  The sub18 -
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ject who fails to draw the conclusion immediately cannot be charged with rational inco-
herence. Though there’s no need for an additional identity premise, doing the arithmetic, 
that is, proving the identity of  ‘24 + 5’ and ‘3+3+3+3+3+6’, is required, which of  course 
might take time. If  so, then the subject is not rationally compelled to “immediately” draw 
the conclusion. But CASE 3 is clearly different from CASE 1, in which no additional time 
would be needed to know or prove that (f  -1 ° f  ) = I after having already understood ( f -1 ° 
f  ) (a) is F. Though an additional identity premise wouldn’t contribute anything to the va-
lidity of  the inference in either case, in the former case the subject could completely un-
derstand ‘24 + 5’ without yet having computed 3+3+3+3+3+6 and thus without knowing 
that they corefer. In the latter case, by contrast, an understanding of  (f  -1 ° f  )  that ex-
cluded understanding that (f  -1 ° f  ) = I  would not be complete understanding at all. As 
such, the conclusion of  this second inference is mediately rationally compulsory. 
	 Though CASE 2 and CASE 3 resemble CASE 1 insofar as they share the same 
logical form, the logical properties of  the terms in the premises are different and, as a re-
sult, their inferential properties are different. The conclusion of  the first is neither deduc-
tively valid (without the identity premise) nor rationally compulsory; the conclusion of  the 
second is deductively valid (the identity premise would not contribute to its validity) but 
not rationally compulsory (does not immediately entail the conclusion). IEK (or CASE 1), 
however, is both deductively valid (the identity premise would not contribute to its validi-
ty) and rationally compulsory (does immediately entail the conclusion).  
	 The parallel being drawn here is between IEK, which is both valid and immedi-
ately compulsory, and the cross-contextual use of  a sentence with coreferring indexical 
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terms, which, OF should claim, can also be deductively valid and immediately rationally 
compulsory. To see this, let us adapt IEK to fit the cases exhibited in (2a) and (2b), such 
that upon recognizing ‘(f  -1 ° f  )(a) is F’ to be true, we must know immediately that ‘I(a) is 
F’ is true, as well. Since the knowledge that ‘I(a) is F’ is true sets in immediately upon 
completely understanding ‘(f  -1 ° f  )(a) is F’ and recognizing it to be true, there’s no logical 
space for an additional identity premise. Therefore, there’s neither the opportunity for a 
subject to coherently take different attitudes to the sentences, nor a rational excuse for the 
subject in failing to recognize the truth-value of  the latter upon being appropriately pre-
sented with it. Thus given immediate knowledge of  coreference without the aid of  an 
identity statement, the terms have the same sense.  
	 To see the parallel, first recall that in (2b) Today is gloomy is the belief  being ascribed 
to Auggy on Tuesday, which we can state explicitly as follows (setting aside, for conve-
nience, the actual days of  the week, Tuesday and Wednesday):  
(a) Auggy believes on d that today is gloomy. 
In believing that today is gloomy and expressing his belief  with the sentence ‘today is 
gloomy’, Auggy must also believe that the sentence ‘today is gloomy’ as uttered on Tues-
day thereby expresses his belief. Furthermore, in taking this (belief) attitude toward today is 
gloomy, Auggy is asserting the truth of  his utterance and thereby the truth of  the sentence 
used to make the utterance. As such, we can also ascribe to Auggy the belief  that the sen-
tence ‘today is gloomy’ is true as used by him on d, which we represent as follows:  
(b) Auggy believes on d that ‘today is gloomy’ is true. 
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Moreover, since Auggy must have sufficient understanding of  ‘today’ in order to refer to 
the current day as “today”—that is, he must know that any use of  ‘today’ refers to the day 
in which the term is used—it follows that he must know also know that ‘today is ψ’ is true 
iff  it is true today that today is ψ iff  ‘today is ψ’ is true today. As such, it must also be the 
case that, 
(c) Auggy believes on d that ‘today is gloomy’ is true today. 
Now, keeping (c) in mind, could we make the following belief-report while nevertheless 
crediting Auggy with rationality: 
(d) Auggy does not believe on d that ‘yesterday was gloomy’ will be true tomorrow. 
 If  (c) and (d) were to obtain, we would be inclined to suppose that Auggy is revealing he 
didn’t fully understand ‘today is gloomy’ in not believing also that ‘yesterday was gloomy’ 
will be true tomorrow. So in order to completely understand ‘today’ in ‘today is gloomy’, 
Auggy must also immediately—that is, just in virtue of  understanding ‘today’—know 
that, tomorrow, the referent will be determined by ‘yesterday’—or, rather, presented as 
yesterday. As such, Auggy knows that ‘today’ on d (Tuesday) and ‘yesterday’ on d+1 
(Wednesday) are coreferring, and he knows this immediately upon understanding ‘today’ 
and ‘yesterday’.  
	 Contrary to the complete understanding a subject might manifest in immediately 
drawing the conclusion in IEK cases, where the compulsion to recognize ‘I(a) is F’ as true 
follows immediately upon recognizing ‘(f  -1 ° f  )(a) is F’ to be true, and hence transpires 
synchronically or in a single context, the complete understanding manifest in cases of  
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coreferring terms in temporally indexical sentences is only manifest cross-contextually, as 
one context (say, Tuesday) converts into another (Wednesday). That is, such understand-
ing is only manifest diachronically, even though immediate knowledge of  coreference is 
tacitly present in, for example, Auggy’s first recognition that ‘today is gloomy’ is true. But 
in order for Auggy to be able to manifest this complete understanding, he must ‘keep 
track’ of  the day, knowing his own temporal position and the referent’s relation to that 
position. If  Auggy does so keep track of  the referent as time proceeds, then Auggy will 
manifest his complete understanding of  ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’, synchronically tacit in his 
knowledge that on Wednesday ‘yesterday was gloomy’ will be true, by immediately recog-
nizing on Wednesday that ‘yesterday was gloomy’ is true. ‘Keeping track’ is, then, quite 
literally a part of  complete understanding in these diachronic, temporally indexical cases. 
	 As such, Auggy’s immediate knowledge of  coreference in complete understanding 
is present in two ways: Auggy knows both immediately that on Wednesday (synchronically tacit) 
and immediately on Wednesday that (diachronically manifest) he must recognize ‘yesterday was 
gloomy’ to be true if  he has recognized ‘today is gloomy’ to be true on Tuesday. As the 
belief-reports from above have indicated, this synchronically tacit understanding is ‘built 
in’ to the understanding of  the indexical. Nobody can understand ‘today’ without know-
ing that, tomorrow, one will need to refer to today with ‘yesterday’. One already makes a 
distinction between today, tomorrow, and yesterday in using ‘today’. What one under-
stands in understanding a temporal indexical sentence is not confined to the context of  
utterance but is, rather, projected into the future (or past). In understanding ‘Today is 
gloomy’ and thereby grasping its sense, Today is gloomy, Auggy immediately knows that if  
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he asserts today that today is gloomy he cannot deny tomorrow that yesterday was gloomy 
(unless he’s re-deliberated the matter, or done something else relevantly akin to delibera-
tion). And all of  that, just in virtue of  understanding the sentence, that is, grasping its 
sense: Today is gloomy. This proposition, as Rödl writes, “breaks free from the given time.”   19
4. RP-MM and Dynamic De Re Senses 
	 Let us take a moment to recap. Recall that RP-NIC has been discharged by our 
having defended the following conditional: if  ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’, used on d and d+1, 
respectively, can be known immediately to corefer in virtue of  complete understanding of  
the terms, then the indexicals have the same Sinn. OF then demonstrated that the condi-
tional’s antecedent obtains: in fact, a subject who completely understands ‘today’ and 
‘yesterday’, usable on d and d+1, will both know immediately on d that on d+1 ‘today’ (on 
d) and ‘yesterday’ (on d+1) will corefer (synchronically tacit) and know immediately on d+1 
that ‘yesterday’ (on d+1) and ‘today’ (on d) corefer (diachronically manifest). Since the an-
tecedent obtains, the indexicals have the same sense. Moreover, since the indexicals each 
express a Sinn and contribute that Sinn to the propositions expressed by the sentences in 
which they occur, and ‘today’ on d and ‘yesterday’ on d+1 have the same sense, the sen-
tences ‘today is gloomy’ on d and ‘yesterday was gloomy’ on d+1 express the same sense, 
the same proposition, and a rationally coherent subject cannot take different attitudes to-
ward each sentence, recognizing one to have a certain truth-value while not recognizing 
the other to have the same truth-value. As such, sentences containing different but core-
ferring indexicals, utterable only at different times, can express the same proposition—
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thereby solving RP-NIC and, partially, The Re-expressibility Problem with which this paper is 
primarily concerned.  
	 For the Fregean, then, jointly preserving Compositionality, Sense-Composi-
tion, and Propositional Re-expressibility is a viable option. Contrary to the as-
sumptions behind Perry’s objections, and Kripke’s and Burge’s worries about keeping all 
three fundamental principles intact (the former denying Propositional Re-express-
ibility, the latter Sense-Composition), OF is able retain all three and Sinn-Bedeu-
tung by demonstrating that different coreferring indexicals can express the same sense. In 
this way, senses and only senses compose the proposition  (Sense-Composition), while 
the sense of  the whole sentence is still determined by the senses of  its parts (Composi-
tionality), which thereby allows the same proposition to be expressed upon substitution 
of  one coreferring indexical for another in the appropriate context (Propositional Re-
expressibility).  
	 As we might recall, RP-NIC is only one aspect of  The Re-expressibility Problem. 
There’s a related problem in the vicinity: RP-MM, which derives from the common 
Fregean equation of  sense and mode of  presentation, according to which there is samness 
of  sense if  and only if  there is sameness of  mode of  representation. Thus, even if  we 
grant that ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ have the same sense, if  they express different modes of  
presentation of  d, it would still seem problematic, or at least un-Fregean, to suppose that 
a single Sinn contains innumerably many modes of  presentation. In reply, the Fregean can 
argue that RP-MM presupposes the NIC uniformity assumption, carving up the rational cog-
nitive unity of  the subject across time into separately analyzable pieces of  belief, when in 
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fact the cognitive life of  the subject is a matter of  preserving unity across time and there-
by satisfying the constraints of  diachronic rationality.  As Evans once claimed, “the 
thought-units of  the atomist are not coherent, independent thoughts at all, but, so to 
speak, cross-sections of  a persisting belief  state.”  According to OF—of  which we here 20
take Evans to be representative—RP-MM presupposes a very thin, very impoverished 
notion of  Fregean Sinn. But this isn’t at all compulsory, nor is it desirable. If  the con-
straints of  diachronic rationality are taken seriously, no such notion of  Fregean sense is 
warranted. Recall that criteria for individuating Sinn are a matter of  what a subject is or is 
not rationally committed to given certain other commitments. If  subjects have rational 
commitments that constrain them across time, then clearly sense must be individuated 
accordingly and must be as robust as the constraints of  diachronic rationality. 
	 As such, OF suggests a way of  conceiving of  indexical Sinne that befits the di-
achronic unity of  rational subjects: as ‘dynamic’. If  Sinn is dynamic in the way proposed 
here, then it makes little sense to abstract specific modes of  presentation from the dynam-
ically persisting Sinn as if  it were a ‘coherent, independent’ Sinn by itself, collecting each 
abstraction into an aggregate of  ‘modes’, lacking a necessary unity and logical coordina-
tion. If  a conception of  sense as dynamic is viable, the Fregean would be able to dissolve, 
rather than need to solve, RP-MM. 
	 We can elucidate this notion of  dynamic sense by invoking another potential ob-
jection, one resting on another unwarranted assumption. Consider, then, this Kaplan-in-
spired objection: assuming we have the appropriate linguistic facility, it would seem that 
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we already completely understand the relevant temporal indexicals at any given time. 
Right now, for example, I know that ‘today’ takes as its referent the day in which I am 
making an utterance; I know that ‘yesterday’ takes as its referent the day prior to the day 
in which I am making an utterance; and so on. And, of  course, I know this without taking 
them to corefer. In fact, completely understanding them precludes me from taking them 
to corefer. Their reference does, after all, shift. It could then be supposed by our antago-
nist both that subjects do not manifest such understanding only diachronically but rather, 
and primarily, at any given moment, i.e. synchronically, and that complete understanding of  
indexicals doesn’t imply knowledge of  coreference. The obstinate Fregean, however, sim-
ply denies the assumption motivating this objection: what a subject understands in com-
pletely understanding, say, ‘today’ is not the term’s ‘standing meaning’, ‘character’, ‘lin-
guistic meaning’, or ‘role’. The Sinne of  indexicals need not be so conceived. Rather, they 
can be conceived of  as de re, object-dependent senses, in which a subject must on a given 
occasion bear the appropriate relation to the object on which the sense depends in order 
to understand the indexical having the sense.  
	 Recall that the Sinn of  a singular term is the mode of  presentation of  the referent. 
‘Today’ is such a term: it has a Sinn which is the mode of  presentation of  the day in ques-
tion. Since now indexical propositions are object-dependent, in order to understand the 
proposition and its constituents (e.g. the sense of  ‘today’) one must bear the appropriate 
relation to the object on which the sense of  the indexical and thus the proposition de-
pend. Each token indexical (together with its coordinated, coreferring indexicals across 
time) has its own object-specific sense.  This Sinn—that which one understands or what 
one ‘grasps’ in understanding—is not a Sinn at all independently of  the object of  which it !
	
!28
is a mode of  presentation.  So the sense of  ‘today’ in the proposition that today is 21
gloomy (the content of  Auggy’s belief  in (2a) on Tuesday) and the sense of  ‘yesterday’ in 
the proposition that yesterday was gloomy (the content of  Auggy’s belief  in (2a) on 
Wednesday) are object-dependent, de re senses specific to Tuesday, the day in question. 
Moreover, when one understands on Thursday, today, that today is gloomy, and also un-
derstands on Thursday, today, that yesterday was gloomy, this does not show, as it is al-
leged to show, that one can understand these indexical terms at the same time yet know 
that they don’t corefer. The ‘today’ one understands on Thursday—today—is not the ‘to-
day’ one understands on Friday. Each term has a different referent and thus a different de 
re sense. So clearly they wouldn’t corefer. The antagonist tries to saddle the Fregean with a 
commitment to the senses of  indexicals as their “standing meaning,” character, et al.—
but this, the obstinate Fregean claims, is by no means compulsory. On this, OF agrees 
with Burge.  
	 So, then, a subject’s understanding of  ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’, conceived as having 
de re senses, does indeed show that understanding can only be manifest diachronically, since 
the referent of  ‘today’ won’t “become” presented as yesterday until tomorrow. Herein en-
ters another crucial component of  OF about indexicals and indexical propositions: un-
derstanding, grasping the sense, requires keeping track of  the object, the day. Under-
standing, as used in the preceding, is only manifest diachronically, such that understand-
ing ‘today’ in ‘today is gloomy’ and ‘yesterday’ in ‘yesterday was gloomy’, each as having 
a de re sense, means one can only understand Yesterday was gloomy, with its constituent Sinn, 
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when ‘yesterday’ is (or becomes) expressive of  the object-dependent sense, when ‘yester-
day’ expresses the mode of  presentation of  the day. This only happens at a different time 
than when ‘today’ had the object-dependent sense expressing the mode of  presentation 
of  the day, the same day. 
	 These de re indexical Sinne are therefore ‘dynamic’.  We can see, then, how this 22
notion helps dissolve RP-MM, which supposes that the Fregean must reject the equation 
of  Sinn and mode of  presentation, because Tuesday’s ‘today’ and Wednesday’s ‘yesterday’ 
patently express different modes of  presentation of  the day. As such, either the equation 
of  sense and ‘mode of  presentation’ must be rejected, or Sinn-Bedeutung as applied to 
indexicals must be disavowed. However, once again, this objection rests on an unwarrant-
ed imposition. For OF, not all Sinne are static and immutable. This is the point of  regard-
ing at least a subclass as dynamic. The notions of  ‘dynamic’ Sinn and ‘keeping track’ are, 
in this manner, mutually explicable. As noted, in order to completely understand one of  
these indexical propositions, recognizing one to be true immediately implying recognition 
of  the other to be true, one must ‘keep track’ of  the referent. Keeping track is a basic 
condition on completely understanding the indexicals. Temporal indexicals have the 
unique feature of  possessing their meaning, or having their object-dependent Sinn, cross-
contextually (that is, not merely contextually, pace Kaplanians). Furthermore, according to 
OF, one never merely keeps track of  the bare, cognitively unclothed referent, to which 
one might ‘directly’ refer under no mode of  presentation at all, as if  the object itself  were 
a constituent of  the thought (pace Burge). Rather, one must keep track through—or 
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“of ”—the de re mode of  presentation of  the referent—the day under its specific mode of  
presentation. And just as the day (qua object) recedes into the past, successively becoming 
yesterday, the day before yesterday, etc., so too does the mode of  presentation “change” 
from today to yesterday to the day before yesterday, etc. The Sinn of  the indexical is, then, very 
aptly called ‘dynamic’.  
	 Since indexical Sinne are in this way constituted cross-contextually, what’s impor-
tant about indexical terms isn’t their standing meaning or that they take different referents 
in different contexts in virtue of  their standing meaning, but, instead, that the referent of  an 
indexical, where the term has a de re sense, remains the same across contexts—that, in-
stead, the “meaning” of  the indexical,  its Sinn, does not remain constant across 23
contexts.  This is to suppose that the meaning of  temporal indexicals is captured first and 24
foremost as dynamic modes of  presentation specific to the referent and only then do they have 
constant meaning.  The constant meaning of  indexical terms can then be conceived of  as 
“sorts” of  de re senses. That is, de re modes of  presentation are able to incorporate con-
stancy of  linguistic meaning because ‘a sort of  de re sense may determine a de re sense (if  
one cares to put it like that)’.  This is to say, object-specific, de re senses can present their 25
objects in the same sorts of  ways; there can be distinct modes of  presentation of  objects 
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that nevertheless present their objects in the same sort of  way. Therefore the constancy of  
linguistic meaning might be something like a second-order sense, if  you like, consequent 
upon the dynamic, object-specific mode of  presentation (the first-order sense). In order to 
dispel puzzlement, consider, for example, a subject perceptually encountering an object 
(the referent, whatever it might be) in the environment, in which the object is presented in 
some way specific to the object, say, as here; but the way that the object presents itself, as 
here, is the same sort of  way other objects present themselves, perhaps in a similar percep-
tual encounter. That ‘here’, in these cases, possesses univocal linguistic meaning can be 
attributed to the fact that distinct objects—the referents of  demonstratives or indexicals—
can be presented to subjects in the same here-sort of  way.    
	 So, instead of  the reference shifting, Sinn shifts; instead of  Sinn remaining constant, 
the referent remains constant. Take, for example, the indexical term ‘today’ as it is linguis-
tically the same across contexts. Since indexicals express de re senses, the sense of  ‘today’ 
will shift across contexts: Tuesday’s today, Wednesday’s today, Thursday’s today, et al. are 
different senses.  Conversely, Tuesday as today on d, Tuesday as yesterday on d+1, Tuesday 26
as the day before yesterday on d+2, et al. are the same sense.  The indexical Sinn would then 27
be, as Frege claimed, ‘wherein the mode of  presentation is contained’.  Here, we see, the 28
!
	
 Again, this part of the account resembles some aspects of Burges, but what motivates both this thesis and its impli26 -
cations are vastly different.
 Indeed, this inversion of the commonplace conception might seem somewhat counterintuitive. But others seem to be 27
sympathetic. Ludlow (ms.) 108, The Dynamic Lexicon e.g., suggests that sense can shiftthough, of course, there are 
no accompanying OF commitments. Ludlow seems, in fact, to corroborate a point made by Branquinho that It does not 
make much senseto think of the thoughts [propositions] as being themselves subjected to any sort of change or re-
alignment.I disagree.
 Beaney (1997), 152. (from “On Sense and Reference”)28
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de re sense contains the mode of  presentation dynamically as today, yesterday, et al. in a sin-
gle de re indexical Sinn. And since the indexical contributes a Sinn to the proposition, the 
proposition itself  is dynamic—or, perhaps more palatably, “diachronic.” 
5. An Objection: Kaplan’s Rip Van Winkle Case Adapted 
	 Now that we have at least a plausible account of  how different coreferring indexi-
cals can have the same sense and likewise have exhibited how a sense can be dynamic, 
persisting through changes of  the modes under which the day-referent is being presented, 
and hence we have tentative solutions to RP-NIC and RP-MM, we must return to the 
specific problem presented in Kaplan’s discussion of  ‘cognitive dynamics’, which will 
function here as an objection to the preceding. It culminates in the case of  Rip Van Win-
kle, from which Kaplan concludes that retaining a belief  cannot merely be a matter of  
believing the same content (proposition) only under a different character. For consider 
Rip, who on d says and believes, “Today is a nice day.” Rip has the habit of  losing track 
of  time, and hence never quite knows his temporal-contextual location. So let us suppose 
that Rip falls asleep on d and wakes up a week later. Taking himself  to have slept only 
through the night, Rip attempts to reiterate the belief  he expressed on d by saying, “Yes-
terday was a nice day.” Rip seems, according to Kaplan, to retain his belief  about d; how-
ever, Rip isn’t able to express that belief, since he’s not in a position to appropriately coor-
dinate context, character, and content. Instead, Rip is determining a content or express-
ing a proposition “about” d+6.  
	 Consider the perhaps more familiar error exemplified by the character “Jones” in 
a (slightly adapted) scenario imagined by Branquinho [1999]: at 11:58pm on d, Jones says 
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and believes, “Today is fine,” but three minutes later, ‘being unaware that midnight had 
already passed,’ Jones says and believes, thinking it is still d, “yesterday was not fine.” This 
scenario presents two problems—one related to belief-retention, the other related to 
(in)coherence. Regarding the former, it seems as if  Jones isn’t in a position to retain on d
+1 the belief  he expressed on d with ‘today is fine’, since he’s unable, given the circum-
stances, to locate himself  in the correct temporal context. If  the indexically expressed be-
lief  is essentially indexical, as Perry [1979] seems to have shown it must be, then Jones 
lacks the resources to indexically express that belief. If  the content of  the belief  is, for 
whatever reason, inexpressible, and the belief  is moreover essentially temporally indexical, 
such that a descriptive belief  would not be the very same belief, then Jones can’t retain the 
very same belief. Regarding the latter, Jones’ belief  on d that today is fine and his belief  
on d+1 that yesterday was not fine seem to exemplify a certain incoherence in Jones’ be-
liefs—Jones is manifestly making contradictory assertions about d. At first glance, then, it 
would seem that OF is committed to charging Jones with rational incoherence, because 
he’s disclosed his failure to keep track of  time by believing on d that today is fine while 
also believing on d+1 that yesterday was not fine.  
	 Jones and Rip are presented as counterexamples to a Fregean account, such as the 
Fregean view defended here, according to which neither Jones nor Rip is able to retain his 
respective belief, since Rip’s ‘yesterday’ and Jones’ ‘yesterday’ fail to determine the in-
tended referent and neither seem to be able to appropriately coordinate context and 
character—Rip doesn’t know a week has passed and Jones doesn’t know midnight has 
passed. Since, according to Kaplan, we are naturally inclined to suppose that both Rip 
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and Jones do in fact retain their beliefs, there must be something wrong with the account 
that results in the contrary supposition. Likewise, it might seem, Auggy in (2b) could have 
forgotten his Tuesday belief—perhaps Mona “accidentally” bopped him on the head with 
a broom for his heresy, causing Auggy to lose some of  his memories—or perhaps he lost 
track of  time like Rip and Jones, not knowing it was Wednesday. But since OF deems 
Auggy in (2b) rationally incoherent for failing on d+1 to recognize as true what he recog-
nized on d to be true (affirming one, denying the other), it must be rejected.  
	 In reply, the obstinate Fregean must claim that such a diagnosis rests on a basic 
misunderstanding both of  Sinn and of  the constraints of  diachronic rationality that figure 
in the individuation of  Sinn. Since OF endorses a version of  the ‘equipollence’ criterion, 
in which sameness of  sense is individuated by appeal to the requirements of  rational co-
herence, it can diagnose these puzzle cases as either unproblematic instances of  a failure 
to re-express an original belief  or as breaches of  the constraints of  diachronic rationality. 
As Schellenberg observes, criteria of  sense are “a matter of  what a person is rationally 
committed to […and] the fact that someone may be distracted or may not be a compe-
tent speaker of  the language is neither here nor there. One is nonetheless rationally 
committed to recognizing B to be true, once one has recognized A to be true” (9). As such, 
the Fregean can retain the spirit, if  not the letter, of  NIC by regarding Sinn as serving the 
purpose primarily of  making maximal sense  of  subjects where such sense, such rational29 -
ity, is due; where, despite coreference, the subject is being rationally coherent or incoher-
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 As McDowell notes (172 [1998]), if theres a pun here, its an instructive one. 29
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ent by anybody’s standards.  The obstinate Fregean will claim, then, that a subject is being 30
rationally coherent or incoherent depending on whether or not the subject does or does not recognize the 
truth-value of  certain propositions given the prior or simultaneous recognition of  the truth-value(s) of  other 
relevant propositions (e.g. ones expressed with coreferring terms).  
	 Therefore, regarding Auggy in (2b)—and Rip and Jones alike—in order to deter-
mine whether or not he’s rationally coherent, it must first be determined exactly what sen-
tence(s) he is or is not rationally committed to recognizing to be true given the prior recogni-
tion of  related sentences to be true. Kaplan identifies this as the crux of  the matter, as 
well, claiming that it must be determined which sentence or sentences the subject must be 
willing to assert in changes of  context.  
6. A Solution to the Puzzle Cases: The Constraints of  Diachronic Rationality 
	 A brief  summary is called for: Kaplan’s puzzle of  cognitive dynamics, adapted to 
the Fregean view and manifest in The Re-expressibility Problem, brings into view the alleged 
untenability of  a Fregean theory of  indexical Sinne that adheres to the principles of  
Compositionality, Sense-Composition, and Propositional Re-expressibility. 
As we recall, The Re-expressibility Problem has two aspects: RP-NIC and RP-MM. It was first 
argued that RP-NIC rests on the fallacious NIC uniformity assumption, which OF could only 
dismantle by first demonstrating that, in the cases at hand, the subject could not, despite 
appearances, take different attitudes to the sentences in question. In cases where the NIC 
uniformity assumption prescribes the contrary interpretation and results in difference of  
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 An appeal to whats rationally coherent or incoherent doesnt settle the issue, nor does it pretend to. Rather, it merely 30
functions as the guiding maxim for an inquiry into the individuation of sense.
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sense, the Fregean can resist such an interpretation by appeal to IEK: if  a subject has 
immediate knowledge of  coreference in virtue of  complete understanding of  the terms, 
thus obviating the need for, or utility of, an identity statement, then the subject cannot 
remain rationally coherent and take different attitudes towards the sentences containing 
those terms. However, puzzle cases in which subjects lose track of  time or suffer a loss of  
memory seem to undermine the notion that the subject is rationally incoherent by being 
unable to recognize the appropriate sentences to be true. That is, it doesn’t seem like a sub-
ject is rationally incoherent in cases involving circumstances where the appropriate belief  
is, according to Kaplan, in some sense retained (or not retained at all) but the subject is 
nevertheless unable to express the belief  due to some manner of  interference with his or 
her unity across time. In other words, it seems eminently plausible to suppose that subjects 
can retain beliefs but be unable to express them by losing track of  time, or by excluding 
former beliefs from their memory and thereby undoing their commitment to them, such 
that a contrary attitude following the loss of  memory wouldn’t stand in opposition to a 
prior belief  to which one might still be committed.  
	 However, as was suggested at the end of  section 2, just as the NIC uniformity assump-
tion issuing from NIC tends to segment portions of  the subject’s cognitive rational unity 
across time in an effort to determine what is and is not coherent merely at a time, so too 
do these puzzle cases presuppose a fallacious version of  NIC by failing to recognize that 
in coming to form certain beliefs and recognizing certain propositions to be true, subjects 
make rational commitments that constrain them diachronically. To suppose otherwise is 
to disregard the imperatives of  rational unity and coherence across time and the con-
straints imposed on subjects in order to preserve such unity and coherence. The puzzle !
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cases exploit the fallible capacities of  subjects that render them susceptible to disruptions 
of  rational unity and continuity of  belief  across time. Whereas in synchronic cases, the 
subject can be bluntly confronted with two sentences at the same time, in which commit-
ment to one utterable at that time implies or doesn’t imply commitment to the other utter-
able at that time, thereby manifesting complete understanding synchronically, in diachronic 
cases, the subject can only be confronted with sentences in the manner in which they were 
ascribed to Auggy in (c) and (d) above, where he has synchronically tacit immediate 
knowledge of  coreference. The subject’s coherence, however, can only be manifest across 
time, which necessarily permits the possibility of  incoherence in acts of  fallible rational 
capacities in which the subject’s unity is disrupted. 
	 Since we are here individuating Sinn by appeal to evident rational commitments—
what sentence(s) a subject must recognize to be true given prior or simultaneous recogni-
tions of  other relevant sentences—but are encountering seemingly intractable diachronic 
cases involving temporally indexical sentences, it will be helpful to recall the more 
tractable, synchronic cases involving sentences utterable at the same time.  If  we can dis-
cern parallel structures in the synchronic and diachronic cases, and have the resources to 
straightforwardly adjudicate the synchronic cases, we’ll have a clue as to how to adjudi-
cate the diachronic cases.  
	 As such, consider the following belief-ascription, where the subject is very evident-
ly breaching the constraints of  rationality by taking opposing attitudes toward the propo-
sition expressed by the sentence, recognizing the content of  one to be true and the other 
false: (1) Mona believes that Cicero wrote Hortenius and De Amicitia; (2) Mona does not be-
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lieve that Cicero wrote De Amicitia. Here, it’s conspicuously evident that Mona is incoher-
ently taking opposing attitudes towards the sentences in (1) and (2). Hence we would 
straightaway charge Mona with rational incoherence. Given (1), Mona is breaching her 
rational commitment to recognize Cicero wrote De Amicitia to be true. Mona would not be 
exhibiting rational incoherence in not believing Tully wrote De Amicitia, or even in believing 
Tully did not write De Amicitia, because she doesn’t know, and needn’t be expected to know, 
that Cicero=Tully. Thus the identity premise would be legitimately informative. 
‘Cicero=Cicero’ is clearly not informative; hence it isn’t needed before Mona moves from, 
say, believing that Cicero wrote Hortenius and De Amicitia to believing that Cicero wrote De 
Amicitia.  When Mona denies the latter, she implicates herself  in rational incoherence. In 31
(2) Mona seems to have lost track of  the tokens of  the same name in the sentences toward 
which she is taking opposing attitudes. She must have lost track; the identity of  the tokens 
would contribute nothing to the validity of  an inference from the former to the latter.  
	 The preceding cases, it would seem, instantiate some ability to ‘keep track’ or fail 
to keep track; it is a basic phenomenon governing inference, belief-formation, and exten-
sion of  belief. Mona must “keep track” of  both the complex predication and the tokens 
of  ‘Cicero’, which, because it’s so effortlessly exercised, is taken for granted. Coreference 
ought to be evident to Mona, and it ought to be so evident immediately. Any such failure to 
keep track and thereby immediately identify coreference results in a violation of  one’s ra-
tional commitment. In Mona’s case, we unproblematically acknowledge this failure and, 
therefore, charge her with rational incoherence. This parallels the rational incoherence 
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 I know some might think that the tokens of the name Ciceromight require an additional identity premise. But this 31
would result in an infinite regress, as Campbell (76 (1994)) has shown. 
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exhibited by Auggy in (2b), where, just as Mona must keep track of  the tokens of  the 
name and the components of  the complex predication, Auggy must keep track of  the day 
across contexts. Both subjects exemplify a failure to satisfy the precondition of  being ra-
tional. ,  Just as Auggy might gently inform Mona that, if  she believes that Cicero wrote 32 33
Hortensius and De Amicitia, then she cannot (or rationally should not) also fail to believe that 
Cicero wrote De Amicitia, so too might Mona, who was the addressee of  Auggy’s Tuesday 
utterance, inform Auggy that he’s contradicting himself  when, on Wednesday, he says 
that yesterday was not gloomy. Upon being chastened by Mona, Auggy would undoubt-
edly reply, “Oh that’s right. Yesterday was gloomy.” This would restore Auggy’s rational 
coherence. So Auggy, like Mona, is recognizing what he must believe on Wednesday in 
order to be coherent.  
	 As we established in section 3, Auggy must have both synchronically tacit knowl-
edge of  coreference and diachronically manifest knowledge of  coreference. But the Ka-
plan-style counterexamples resisted this claim by appealing to cases of  subjects losing 
track of  time and therefore not exhibiting rational incoherence—in the Rip and Jones 
cases, the belief  was retained but, in some sense, inexpressible; in the Auggy case, there 
was a loss of  memory and therefore no obtaining contrary attitude. But we have just here 
discerned a parallel structure between synchronic and diachronic cases—both require 
some measure of  ‘keeping track’; both require subjects to satisfy certain preconditions in 
order to acquire and maintain complete understanding. However, in the synchronic cases, 
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 The need for Mona to keep trackof tokens of a name is not merely a metalinguistic affair but also a matter of tak32 -
ing those tokens to be the name of the same object. I hope this is clear in the text.
 It is, as Evans [1983] claims, not an optional addition to, but a precondition of, temporal thought(309). 33
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failures to ‘keep track’ that result in violations of  rational commitments do not absolve the 
subject of  rational incoherence—we straightforwardly charge the subject with rational 
incoherence for failing to appropriately recognize each sentence’s truth-value. Likewise, 
given the parallel structure and our unproblematic inclination to charge such subjects 
with rational incoherence, we ought to charge Rip, Jones, and Auggy with rational inco-
herence despite the fact that they have lost track of  time. Since the ability to keep track 
must be presupposed in order for subjects to be rational in the first place, any rational 
commitments that rely on these abilities are equally constrained in order to retain rational 
coherence.  
	 Our reluctance to make such charges of  incoherence, as evinced by the almost 
irresistible appeal of  Kaplan-style puzzle cases, only serves to disclose a failure to take se-
riously the constraints of  diachronic rationality in the individuation of  sense. An obstinate 
Fregean, however, is not in the position to neglect such constraints. Since individuating 
indexical Sinn is a matter of  keeping commitments and remaining coherent across time, 
what a subject is committed to and must know immediately to corefer is a matter not of  
what in fact is evident to a subject but of  what ought to be evident to a subject. Tokens of  
names in successive premises of  an inference, for example, or cases of  the form and con-
tent exhibited in IEK, ought to be perspicuously evident to the rational subject, even if  
something could interfere with such evidence. The fallible rational capacities of  subjects 
will always permit this possibility.  Even if  the subject for some reason did not immedi34 -
ately draw the appropriate conclusion (say, concluding ‘Something wrote both Hortensius 
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 Consider the way in which we must base many of our judgments about the environment on perceptual experiences, 34
even though perceptual experiences could always be non-veridical due to our general susceptibility to error, i.e. our 
fallibility.
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and De Amicitia’ from ‘Cicero wrote Hortensius’ and ‘Cicero wrote De Amicitia’) an identity 
premise would contribute nothing to the validity of  the inference containing the tokens of  
the name ‘Cicero’. Likewise, it has been argued, an identity premise would be uninforma-
tive to a subject who has complete understanding of  ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’, used on d 
and d+1, respectively, since a condition of  complete understanding is ‘keeping track’ of  
the day in just the same way—with perhaps some additional exertion and mental stami-
na—as keeping track of  tokens in synchronically representable inferences or cases of  
transparent coreference (i.e. IEK).  
	 But there’s a complication here. Take Jones, for example. In order for Jones to be 
contradicting his belief  on d about d that today is fine, the constituent indexical Sinn of  
‘today’ used on d must be the very same indexical Sinn as that of  ‘yesterday’ used on d+1, 
otherwise by Compositionality it isn’t the same proposition being expressed. That is, if  
they do not express the same sense Jones wouldn’t be recognizing to be true and recogniz-
ing to be false sentences expressive of  the same proposition, for the indexical in the negat-
ed sentence on d+1 does not express the same sense as the indexical used on d. Given that 
these indexical senses are dynamic and a precondition of  re-expressing the same content 
in different contexts is ‘keeping track’ of  the day-referent under its shifting modes of  pre-
sentation, if  one has lost track of  the day-referent, then one cannot re-express the same 
sense as originally expressed. But what, then, is Jones asserting when he says, “yesterday 
was not fine,” given that he has lost track of  time? 
	 The complication derives from the indexicality of  these sentences. The sentence 
type ‘yesterday was not fine’ can express innumerably many propositions, according to 
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the Fregean. Given a specific context, it will express just one proposition. But as the 
Fregean claims, if  recognizing one sentence to be true rationally commits one to recogniz-
ing certain other sentences to be true, those sentences have the same sense. However, 
when it comes to indexical sentences, it’s only sentence uses to which one is committed. In 
other words, the Fregean already knows that when Jones recognizes ‘today is fine’ to be 
true on d, he rationally commits himself  to recognizing  ‘yesterday was fine’ to be true on 
d+1, since both sentences express the same proposition. But when Jones says on d+1, 
“yesterday was not fine,” Jones thinks it’s still d and thus his use of  the sentence evinces a 
failure to keep track of  time, so it isn’t clear it’s the same sentence Jones has committed 
himself  to in recognizing ‘today is fine’ to be true. The question, then, is this: does Jones’ 
‘yesterday’ express the same sense as his use of  ‘today’? If  so, he’s being rationally inco-
herent. If  not, he’s not being rationally incoherent.  
	 OF seems to have two options here. There’s the externalist option and (what I’ll 
call) the non-referring indexical option. Regarding the former—which seems to be implic-
it in the position expounded in section 4 on object-dependent senses—there is some fact 
of  the matter as to what the day actually is. So d in the Jones case is or is not yesterday. If  
d has passed over into d+1, then d has become yesterday. So whether Jones knows it or 
not, he inhabits the context of  d+1. As such, d is being presented—as a matter of  external 
“fact”—under the mode yesterday. Likewise d-1 is being presented under the mode the day 
before yesterday. These days are being presented under certain modes, even if  they’re not so 
presented to Jones. Just as Venus is being presented as Hesperus in evening even if  one 
doesn’t know this, or takes the object that is Venus to actually be a distant star. Returning 
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to the point: since Jones’ environment at least partially determines the content of  his be-
lief, and the environment, in this case, is a matter of  the day-context, the content of  Jones’ 
belief—determined or expressed by his use of  the sentence ‘yesterday was not fine’—is 
about d and not d-1. In this way, Jones’ use of  ‘yesterday’ on d+1 expresses the same sense 
as his use of  ‘today’ on d. Since the sentences used express the same proposition on their 
respective occasions of  use, Jones is being rationally incoherent. 
	 Another option might suggest itself  here: Jones’ use of  ‘yesterday’ is determining 
no content whatsoever. Or rather, Jones’ ‘yesterday’ contributes no mode of  presentation 
of  a referent at all to the proposition Jones attempts to express. This implies that Jones’ 
use of  ‘yesterday’ on d+1 does not have the same sense as his use of  ‘today’ on d. Given 
the notion of  object-dependent senses, since ‘yesterday’ has no referent, it does not con-
tribute a sense to a proposition, and thus no proposition is expressed by Jones’ use on d+1 
of  ‘yesterday was not fine’. This is a peculiar view because  (pure) indexicals are not ordi-
narily the kinds of  lexical items that could be non-referring. But if  one takes some pure 
indexicals to be in part semantically individuated by the intention of  the speaker, then it 
seems plausible to suppose that failures of  reference can be due to failures of  the inten-
tions of  the speaker to match up with facts about the environment. In this way, the index-
ical has an incomplete content, that is, the intention in using the indexical somehow con-
tributes a partial content, but since it fails to match up with the world, there’s a certain 
gap in the quasi-proposition expressed.  
	 Though somewhat spooky, the view isn’t unintelligible. Consider, for example, an 
utterance involving a demonstration: ‘that is on the table’. Now, the character of  ‘that’ in 
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this context doesn’t, all by itself, determine a referent. According to Kaplan, it needs to be 
supplemented with a demonstration or, perhaps, an intention of  the speaker. Well, sup-
pose the speaker intends the referent of  ‘that’ to be some solid crystal geometrical figure. 
However, as a matter of  fact, there is no such figure on the table but rather the false ap-
pearance of  such a figure caused by, perhaps, the lighting and some objects in the room. 
There’s nothing particularly unintelligible about ‘that’ being a non-referring demonstra-
tive here—and non-referring because of  failure of  the intention of  the speaker to match 
up with the world. If  the speaker is pointing at the table, intending to point at the geomet-
rical figure, the speaker is pointing at something, say, a dust particle, but it’s not what the 
speaker intends to be demonstrating. Likewise, ‘today’ is “pointing” at something, namely, 
the day in which the utterance is made, but it’s not determining the referent (or presenting 
the referent under its actual mode, if  that makes sense) the speaker intends to determine.  
	 But here, we’ll set aside this latter option. Though I believe the non-referring in-
dexical option is compatible with the Fregeanism defended here, it doesn’t seem to be in 
spirit of  its implicit externalism. As such, since Jones has synchronically tacit immediate 
knowledge of  coreference and is rationally constrained to have diachronically manifest 
knowledge of  coreference (that is, he must keep track of  time and be able to completely 
understand his use of  ‘yesterday was not fine’), he is being rationally incoherent in recog-
nizing one sentence to be true and the other false.  
7. Conclusion 
	 The puzzle of  cognitive dynamics isn’t, or shouldn’t be, about how subjects retain 
belief. That would seem to be a bit of  idle speculation. Rather, the puzzle is about what 
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sentences the subject must be willing to assert in order to express his belief, and how we 
might determine what belief  a subject might have by the sentences such a subject would 
assert. We have focused on cases in which one takes oneself  to have a certain belief  but, in 
fact, the content of  the belief  they take themselves to have is quite different from the con-
tent of  the belief  they actually have. Perhaps Evans was gesturing at this diagnosis when 
he said he saw nothing wrong in supposing a person “who [habitually] loses track of  time 
cannot retain beliefs.”   Given externalist assumptions, this seems to be true. And given 35
the way the Fregean individuates Sinn, it seems committed to this assessment of  the cases.   
	 Moreover, there’s nothing in the account sketched above that precludes a subject 
from “getting back on track,” such that a subject could locate the appropriate belief-con-
tent by, say, being reminded of  her contextual position. There’s nothing in the notion of  
‘keeping track’ that precludes a subject from getting off  track, being interrupted, etc. and 
then being put back on track and re-focused on the referent. 
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